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INTRODUCTION

There is a snowballing movement throughout the United States, calling
for unions to obtain workers' consent before using portions of their dues and
salaries for political contributions.1 This reform movement could seriously

* Editor's Note: This note received the Barbara W. Makar writing award for Spring
1998.
** This note is dedicated to my father, Carl Morgan Adams, Jr.
1. See Thomas Love, DeclaringWar on Union PoliticalDues, NATION'S Bus., Jan. 1998,

at 42, 42-43 (stating that in 1998, initiatives that would require unions to gain workers'
consent before using their dues for political purposes will likely appear on the ballot in
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reduce the amount of financial contributions that political parties, particularly
the Democrats, will receive from organized labor.2 The recent legislative
attention to this issue is highlighted by the general support of the U.S.
populace for the proposition that unions should be required to obtain
permission from workers before funneling their money into campaign
coffers.'
California, through what has been described as a "political
miracle ' 4 for labor unions, failed to successfully follow Washington state's
lead5 with the passage of an initiative that would have required unions to
obtain the advance written and yearly consent of both member and
nonmember workers before allocating portions of their dues or salaries to
politics. 6 However, it is estimated that defeating the California initiative cost

Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, and Oregon, and that similar legislation is
expected to pass in Idaho, Iowa, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah,
Wyoming, and Colorado). Furthermore, bills with similar provisions have been introduced
in Maryland, Michigan, and Vermont. S. 480, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998); S.650, 89th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 1997); H. 695, 65th Leg., Adj. Sess. (Vt. 1998).
2. See Thomas Stratmann, How Reelection Constituencies Matter: Evidence from
PoliticalAction Committees' Contributionsand CongressionalVoting, 39 J.L. & ECON. 603,
604 (1996)(stating that "labor PACs" give approximately 90% of their contributions to the
Democratic party); see also LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS:
THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 53 (1996) (stating that labor unions

give "close to 100 percent" of their money to the Democratic party).
3. Campaign Reform Initiative: Polls Show StrongSupportfor Workers' Rights Provision
in California's Campaign Reform Initiative (Cal. Fdn. for Campaign Reform, Tustin, Cal.),
1997. The following polls reflect support for such reform: (1) Washington Post/ABC News
poll - 82% (Oct. 9-13, 1997), (2) CNN/USA Today Gallup poll - 72% (Oct. 3-5, 1997), and
(3) Tarrence Group/Public Opinion StrategieslVoterConsumer Research poll - 67% (Oct.
7-9, 1997). Id.
4. Amy Bayer, Election '98 California Primary: Union Victory on Proposition 226
Called "PoliticalMiracle," SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., June 4, 1998, at A19.
5. Fair Campaign Practices Act, 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 2 (Initiative Measure 134)
(amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.095, 42.17.125, 42.17.510, 41.04.230, 42.17.180,
42.17.390, 42.17.240 (1992)). California's "Campaign Reform Initiative" (CRI) was modeled
after Washington Initiative 134, which was approved in 1992. Christopher Rapp, Check-mate:
Protecting Workers' Paychecksfrom PredatoryUnions Is Good Politics- and Simple Justice,
NAT'L REV., Jan. 26, 1998, at 30, 30.
6. Campaign Reform Initiative: Text of the Campaign Reform Initiative, § 4, ch. 5.9.
(Cal. Fdn. for Campaign Reform, Tustin, Cal.), 1997 [hereinafter CRI: Text]. The CRI
appeared on the ballot in June of 1998. Campaign Reform Initiative: Summary of the
Campaign Reform Initiative (Cal. Fdn. for Campaign Reform, Tustin, Cal.), Nov. 7, 1997
[hereinafter CRI: Summary]. It failed to pass with 54% voting against to 46% in favor. Scott
McConnell, Barrio Blues, NAT'L REV., Aug. 17, 1998, at 31. The initiative seemed to have
overwhelming support. California Reform Initiative: California Voters Overwhelmingly
Support the CampaignReform Initiative (Cal. Fdn. for Campaign Reform, Tustin, Cal.), 1997
[hereinafter CRI: Voter Support]. A statewide poll conducted in March 1997 suggested that
the CRI would pass by a margin exceeding 8:1. Id. The dramatic voter turnaround has been
attributed to the costly and aggressive campaign run by organized labor, which included
claims that the proposed measure would "threaten police officers by publishing their home
addresses" and would "afford big business" and the Republican party an unfair advantage over
labor unions and the Democratic party. Bayer, supra note 4, at A19.

1998]

UNION DUES AND POLITICS

labor unions over twenty million dollars,7 and California is but one of many
states that recently have been stirring with reform measures that are similar
to those passed in Washington.8
The purpose of this note is to examine the current movement towards
implementing legislation that would require unions to obtain workers'
consent prior to using their compulsory dues and fees for political purposes.
Part II is devoted to framing the major developments in the law that have
roughly defined the limits of unions' use of compulsory dues for political
purposes. Part III provides an analysis of relevant U.S. Supreme Court
cases and emphasizes First Amendment questions surrounding union
expenditures of compulsory union dues and fees. Part IV addresses the
movement in some states to require unions to obtain affirmative consent from
employees before directing their dues or fees to political causes. Part V
focuses on the wider ramifications of these "campaign reform" movements
on political parties and on the continued vitality of unions. Particular
attention is given to the effect that reform movements might have on public
schools.
II.

DEFINING THE LiMIrS OF LABOR'S USE OF COMPULSORY DUES

A.

International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street

In InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Street,9 the U.S. Supreme Court
for the first time examined the issue of whether labor organizations were at
liberty to use worker dues, over their objections, for political purposes.1 °
A group of railroad employees challenged the constitutionality of section 152,
Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act (RLA)," which through its
authorization of the "union shop,"12 enabled unions to make political
contributions with compulsory membership dues without obtaining the
approval of all of their members. 3 The Supreme Court had previously held
in Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson14 that the Railway Labor Act,
7. Bayer, supra note 4, at A19.

8. See sources cited supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
10. Id. at 744.
11. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1952) (providing in part that labor organizations may enter
into agreements with employers that require all employees to become members so long as
membership is offered to them on the "same terms and conditions as are generally applicable
to any other member").
12. Union shop agreements generally mandate that employees become members of the
union after a specified grace period and remain members until expiration of the bargaining
agreement. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 642 (1976).
13. Street, 367 U.S. at 742-45.
14. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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on its face, did not violate the First Amendment rights of employees to freely
associate through its authorization of the union shop. 15 However, the Street
Court distinguished the case from the Hanson decision, stating that the record
in Hanson failed to specifically establish that membership dues were being
used for political purposes over the objections of union members. 16 In
Street, the Court looked instead to the history of the statute to determine
legislative intent, thereby avoiding the constitutional question. 7 The Court
found that one of the congressional aims of the section was to eliminate the
"free rider" problem while protecting employees' "freedom to dissent."' 8
The Court reasoned that the unions' use of compulsory dues for political
causes fell outside the scope of this congressional aim because such a use
was unrelated to defraying union bargaining and administrative costs and
conflicted with the interests of dissenting members.' 9 The Court consequently held that the statute itself prohibited unions from directing membership dues, "over an employee's objection," to political causes.20
The Street decision states that unions have no affirmative duty to solicit
member consent before directing dues to political causes. 2' The Court
found that it is the dissenting employees who, in fact, have an affirmative
duty to object to the use of their dues for political purposes, which must be
voiced before such use becomes prohibited under the statute. 2 The Street
Court further found that a blanket injunction against union expenditures for
political purposes would fly in the face of the First Amendment rights of the

15. Id. at 238.
16. Street, 367 U.S. at 747-49.
17. Id. The Court stated: " 'When the validity of an act of the Congress is . . . in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided.' " Id. at 749 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932)).
18. Id. at 765-67. "Free riders" are employees who do not pay union dues, yet derive
benefits from its actions on behalf of union members. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 222 (1977).
[O]bjecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of not only the
direct costs of negotiating and administering a collective bargaining contract and of
settling grievances and disputes, but also the expenses of activities reasonably
employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the union as the exclusive
representative of employees in the bargaining unit.
48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor & Labor Relations § 104 (1994).
19. Street, 367 U.S. at 768.
20. Id. at 768-69; see W. Kearns Davis, Jr., Note, Crawford v. Air Line Pilots
Association: The Fourth CircuitDetermines What Expenses a Union May Chargeto Nonunion
Workers, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1732, 1738-39 (1994).
21. See Street, 367 U.S. at 744.
22. Id. at 774. The Court reasoned that in the face of employee objections, continuance
by the union to spend their dues is not authorized by the statute. Id. at 768-71.
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"majority" to express its political ideas.23 Instead, the Court suggested that
the appropriate remedies might be: (1) enjoining political expenditures by the
union on behalf of dissenting employees who have made their objections
known to the union and (2) restitution to dissenting employees of the portion
of dues that the union spent on political causes to which the employees had
Thus, the Court in finding that "dissent is not to be
objected. 24
presumed, ' 25 essentially created a presumption that union members approve
26
of the use of their dues for any political cause that a union may support.
This view seems to suggest a further presumption that a union supports the
interests of all employees.
B.

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education

In Abood v. DetroitBoard of Education,27 the Supreme Court examined
the constitutionality of the Detroit Federation of Teachers Union's use of
agency fees, which are fees paid to the union by nonmembers for union
services directed at "negotiating and administering [a] labor contract, ' 28 to
fund political causes over state employees' objections. 29 A group of
nonunion teachers alleged that the agency shop agreement 3° at issue,
authorized by a Michigan statute, infringed on their freedom of association
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 The Court first addressed
whether its rulings in Hanson and Street were applicable to an agency shop
operating in the public sector.32 The Court failed to draw any significant
distinction between the state action it had recognized in Hanson (where it
examined the union shop provision of the RLA) and the state action at issue33
here where the government had entered into an agency shop agreement.
It found that an employee in the public sector does not have a "weightier

23. Id. at 771.
24. Id. at 774-75.
25. Id. at 774.
26. See id.
27. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
28. GORMAN, supra note 12, at 642. Agency fees are made pursuant to an "agency shop"
agreement. Id.
29. Abood, 431 U.S. at 225-42.
30. Under an agency shop agreement, employees are not required to become members of
the union, but must pay the union an agency fee for "services rendered by the union to
employees within the bargaining unit as the employees' 'agent' in negotiating and
administering the labor contract." GORMAN, supra note 12, at 642.
31. Abood, 431 U.S. at 212-15; see U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Ralph
H. Brock, Giving Texas Lawyers Their Dues: The State Bars Liability Under Hudson and
Keller for Politicaland IdeologicalActivities, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 47, 59 (1996) (discussing

the Abood decision).
32. Abood, 431 U.S. at 217.
33. Id. at 226-32.
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First Amendment interest than a private employee in not being compelled to
contribute to the costs of exclusive union representation. 34 The Court
concluded that its decisions in Hanson and Street were applicable to Abood,
and thus the state law authorizing the agency shop was constitutional, insofar
as it permitted compulsory union fees to be used for costs directly related to
collective bargaining.35
However, the Court held that the use of agency fees for political and
"other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective bargaining
representative" over the express objection of employees offends the First
Amendment. 36 The Court relied, in part, on Buckley v. Valeo, which held
that the First Amendment protects an individual's right to contribute to an
organization.37 The Court expanded this reasoning to conclude, in essence,
that the First Amendment also protects an individual's right not to contribute
to an organization.38 However, the Court limited its holding by reiterating
its position in Street3 9 that employees have an affirmative duty to make their
objections to use of compulsory fees for political purposes known to the
union before they are entitled to relief.'n " '[D]issent is not to be presumed
, "41

C.

Communication Workers of America v. Beck

In Communication Workers of America v. Beck,42 a group of employees
of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company challenged the use of
their agency shop fees by the Communication Workers of America union for
"purposes other than collective bargaining, contract administration, or
grievance adjustment. '43 The employees alleged that the union's use of
these fees for lobbying, organizing employees of other employers, and social,
charitable, and political events violated the union's duty of fair representation
under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the
First Amendment.' The Court failed to address the First Amendment issue

34. Id. at 229.
35. Id. at 231-32.
36. Id. at 235-36.
37. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976)).
38. Id. at 234; see also Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (finding that
consistent with the First Amendment, the California Bar may not use compulsory dues for
political and ideological causes to which members object).
39. See supra text accompanying notes 15-26 (outlining the Street position).
40. Abood, 431 U.S. at 238.
41. Id. (quoting Street, 367 U.S. at 774).

42. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
43. Id. at 739.
44. Id. at 739-40; see National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1994).
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and instead looked to the congressional intent of the NLRA. 45 Relying on
its holding in Street, the Court equated section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA to
section 2, Eleventh, of the RLA and similarly held that the NLRA only
authorizes unions to use dues and agency fees for purposes related to
"'performing the duties of an exclusive [bargaining] representative.' ,46
While the Court's holding in Beck differed little from that of Street, the
ramifications of the decision were much greater due to the NLRA's more
general applicability to employers, employees, and unions in the United
States.
D. Lehnhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n
In Lehnhert v. FerrisFaculty Ass 'n,47 the U.S. Supreme Court revisited
the issue of using compulsory agency fees for "purposes other than
48
negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agreement.
Michigan state employees argued that, under the First Amendment, the Ferris
Faculty Association union could not, over their dissent: (1) direct agency fees
to lobbying unrelated to obtaining "legislative ratification of, or fiscal
appropriations for, their collective-bargaining agreement ...

[and (2) use of

these] fees for activities that ... are not undertaken directly on behalf of the
bargaining unit to which the objecting employees belong. '49 A divided
Court adopted a three-prong test for determining whether a dissenting
employee's agency fees could legally be applied to a particular union
activity.5" The activity "'must (1) be "germane" to collective bargaining
activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor
policy and avoiding "free riders"; and (3) not significantly add to the
burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or
45. Beck, 487 U.S. at 744-54. By analyzing Beck in terms of the NLRA rather than the
First Amendment, the Court did not have to determine whether the NLRA implicated state
action. David H. Topol, Union Shops, State Action, and the National Labor Relations Act,
101 YALE L.J. 1135, 1140 (1992).
46. Beck, 487 U.S. at 752 (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks,
466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)) (alteration in the original); see also George Feldman, Unions,
Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187,
231-33 (1994) (suggesting that the Court erred in concluding that the legislative history of the
NLRA supported the Court's holding that unions were not authorized to use fees and dues for
nonrepresentational purposes over dissenting employees' objections).
47. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
48. Id. at 513.
49. Id. at 519. The Court had previously addressed the issue of whether unions could,
consistent with the First Amendment, use dissenting employees' fees for union conventions,
social events, and publications. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456. In finding that these uses of
compulsory fees were constitutional, the Court considered the governmental interests in
overcoming the free-rider problem as well as the level of encroachment on employees'
freedom of speech. Id.
50. Davis, supra note 21, at 1741-42 (citing Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519-20).
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union shop.' 51
While a majority of the Court agreed on the rule, the Justices disagreed
as to how the rule should be applied to the specific union activities under
review. 52 However, the Court obtained a majority decision on several of the
issues it addressed.5 3 It held that a local union may charge dissenting
employees for costs related to activities involving its "state and national
affiliates," even if the local employees were not direct or intended
beneficiaries of such activities.5 4 It also found that union expenditures,
which included dissenting employees' fees, on an educational publication
were permissible because the publication was informational as opposed to
political or public.55 The Court further found that the union could use fees
of objecting employees to finance trips by union delegates to conventions
involving the parent union. 6 Finally, the Court concluded that the union
could charge objecting employees for preparation expenses directed at
carrying out an illegal strike.57 More significantly, however, the Court
failed to obtain a majority on the issue of lobbying expenditures 58 and
public relations expenditures directed at elevating the status of the teaching
profession generally. 59
In Lehnhert, the First Amendment was implicated because the teachers'
union was making expenditures to which employees had voiced objections. 60 This decision seems to demonstrate that even where the First
Amendment is implicated by employees' objections, their First Amendment
rights will sometimes be required to give way to the government interest in
preserving union shops.61 It also illustrates the inherent difficulty of
determining which union expenditures are "'germane' to collective
bargaining" and are deemed so important to the integrity of labor policy that
they are constitutional, despite the First Amendment interests of employees.62

51. Id. at 1741-42 (quoting Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519).
52. Id. at 1742.
53. Id. at 1743.
54. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524. However, the Court qualified its holding by stating that a
local union may not direct fees from dissenters to "bargaining activities wholly unrelated to
the employees in the unit" such as activities of an unrelated bargaining unit. Id.
55. Id. at 529.

56. Id. at 530.
57. Id. at 530-32.
58. Justice Blackman argued that because the lobbying in this case did not relate to
obtaining either the legislative ratification of a collective-bargaining agreement or
appropriations (as is often necessary in the public sector), the union's use of objecting
employees' dues for such purposes was unjustified, political, and infringed on their First
Amendment rights. Id. at 519-22.
59. Id. at 528-29.
60. See id. at 516-19, 524.
61. Id. at 518, 524-32; see Ellis, 466 U.S. at 435, 455-56.
62. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 516.
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III.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE EMPLOYEE
OBJECTION REQUIREMENT

The current predicament of employees who shoulder the burden to
"object" in order to ensure that unions do not allocate their money to political
causes raises serious First Amendment questions. 63 The holding of the
Abood majority that the First Amendment requires that union political
expenditures be derived from union dues or union charges "paid by
employees who do not object" to such political expenditures did not go far
enough in answering the First Amendment issue before the Court. 64 For
example, Justice Powell, concurring in Abood, raised strong objections to the
majority's failure to distinguish between the public and private sectors in its
finding that an agency shop is constitutional. 65 He argued that the
government interests enunciated in Hanson and Street were misplaced in
Abood, where the government, rather than a private entity, was a party to the
collective bargaining agreement. 66 Thus, in Justice Powell's view, the
government can authorize an agency or union shop agreement between
private parties without implicating the First Amendment. 67 However, the
government acting as a party to a collective bargaining agreement cannot
likewise authorize an agency shop.68
Justice Powell sharply criticized the majority for placing the burden on
an employee to "vindicate" his or her First Amendment rights of association
and free speech. 69 "[T]o vindicate his First Amendment rights in a union
shop, the individual employee apparently must declare his opposition to the
union and initiate a proceeding to determine what part of the union's budget
has been allocated to activities that are both 'ideological' and 'unrelated to

63. See generally Abood, 431 U.S. at 209 (by implication).
64. Id. at 234-36.
65. Id. at 246-50 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
66. Id. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell argued for a narrow reading of
those cases and suggested that they provided no guidance to the First Amendment issues in
Abood because, in deciding them, the Court presumably did not reach any constitutional
issues. ld.
67. Id. at 251-53 (Powell, J., concurring). But see Street, 367 U.S. at 777 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("Since neither Congress nor the state legislature can abridge those rights, they
cannot grant the power to private groups to abridge them. As I read the First Amendment,
it forbids any abridgment by government whether directly or indirectly."); Topol, supra note
46, at 1135 (arguing that state action implicating the First Amendment exists in private sector
union shop agreements because the federal government, through the NLRA, has facilitated
compulsory dues that can be allocated to ideological and political causes).
68. Abood, 431 U.S. at 252-54 (Powell, J., concurring). "The State in this case has not
merely authorized agency-shop agreements between willing parties; it has negotiated and
adopted such an agreement itself." Id. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 254-55 (Powell, J., concurring).
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collective bargaining.' ,70 Justice Powell stated that the burden should be
on the State to demonstrate that union dues or fees required of nonunion
employees are necessary "to serve paramount governmental interests.
Justice Powell asserted that in the public sector, collective bargaining
agreements requiring compulsory fees from all employees involve state action
and therefore, trigger the First Amendment rights of dissenting employees.72
Thus, in his opinion, the State should justify this infringement on the First
Amendment rights of its employees.73 In Beck and Street, both of which
involved the private sector, the Court did not resolve the First Amendment
question because it construed the RLA and the NLRA to preclude a union
from using dues for political purposes in the face of employee objections.74
However, Justice Black, dissenting in Street, addressed the First
Amendment implications of private sector union shops.7 5 He argued that
the RLA is unconstitutional insofar as it permits or is applied to permit the
use of the union shop whereby compulsory membership results in the

70. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). However, when an employee objects to union
expenditures, the Court has limited the ability of a union to skirt such an objection, even
temporarily. Ellis, 104 466 U.S. at 457 (finding that a union cannot collect dissenting
employees' dues and then later rebate the portion of them that would have been allocated to
the objectionable cause). Restitution is an appropriate remedy in such cases. Street, 367 U.S.
at 775; 48 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 19, § 287. Furthermore, the Court has held that nonunion
employees who object to the union's use of their dues for political purposes are entitled under
the Constitution to "an adequate explanation of the basis for the [agency] fee, a reasonably
prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and
an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending." Chicago
Teacher Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986); see 48 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 19,
§ 104; Laura L. Scarry, Implementing Waters v. Churchill in Light of the Loudermill
PreterminationHearing, 15 PUB. INTEREST 85, 105 (1997).
71. Abood, 431 U.S. at 255 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell also suggested that
requiring compulsory union fees from employees who oppose the very idea of unionism
seriously infringes First Amendment rights. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). He stated that
collective bargaining in the public sector is political, as even decisions regarding wages and
benefits necessarily affect priorities within state budgets as well as taxes. Id. at 257-58
(Powell, J., concurring).
72. See id., 431 U.S. at 251-59 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
73. Id. at 255 (Powell, J., concurring). However, Justice Powell seemed to opine that the
government's authorization of the union and agency shop was not sufficient state action to
implicate the First Amendment rights of dissenting employees in the private sector. Id. at
251-59 (Powell, J., concurring). Despite Powell's distinction between public and private
sector collective bargaining, state action is involved in both. Topal, supra note 45, at 1135
(providing a more comprehensive analysis of the issue involving state action with respect to
union shops and the RLA and NLRA). In the public sector, state action is eminently clear
as the federal government is a party to an agreement that essentially provides for compulsory
fees, which the union is authorized to allocate to political causes. Abood, 431 U.S. at 252-53
(Powell, J., concurring). In the private sector, state action is embodied in the enabling
legislation. See Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
74. Beck, 487 U.S. at 761-63; Street, 367 U.S. at 750-51.
75. Street, 367 U.S. at 788-791.
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exaction of dues from objecting parties for political purposes. 76 The federal
government, by enacting the RLA and thereby authorizing the union shop,
has enabled a group to promote causes "at the expense of persons who do not
choose to be members of the group., 77 Thus, the RLA can "constitutionally
authorize no more than to make a worker pay dues to a union for
the sole
78
purpose of defraying the cost of acting as his bargaining agent.
In light of Justice Powell's concurrence in Abood, and Justice Black's
dissent in Street, it is clear that there are substantial First Amendment
concerns regarding the agency and union shop in both the private and public
sectors. 79 Because the Court heavily relied on Street in deciding Abood, 80
the Court refrained from engaging in a full blown First Amendment analysis
of the agency shop. 8 ' For Powell, in the public sector, under either an
agency shop or a union shop, First Amendment rights are infringed by
requiring fees from any dissenter.82 Thus, the State should have been
required to demonstrate that its interests outweighed those of the dissenters
who opposed compulsory fees.83 Powell seemed to reserve judgment as to
whether the State could make such a showing that would justify a First
Amendment infringement and instead, simply suggested that a8 4true First
Amendment analysis should have been undertaken by the Court.
Justice Black's dissent in Street went even further in advocating First
Amendment protections to dissenting employees.85 In Black's opinion, the
government cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, authorize unions
to direct compulsory dues to political causes, even if an employee fails to
object to such political expenditures.86 He stated that "the First Amendment
bars use of dues extorted from an employee by law for the promotion of
causes, doctrines and laws that unions generally favor to help the unions, as
well as any other political purposes. ' '87 Thus, Black concluded that section
2, Eleventh, of the RLA, by "authorizing application of the union-shop

76. Id. at 785-791 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black criticized the majority for going
too far out of its way to avoid the constitutional question involved in this case. Id. at 784
(Black, J., dissenting). He stated that the majority read provisions into the RLA that clearly
were not intended by Congress. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 789 (Black, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting).
79. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 250-55 (Powell, J., concurring); Street, 367 U.S. at 785-91

(Black, J., dissenting).
80. Abood, 431 U.S. at 216.
81. Id.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 254-55 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 255 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 250-55 (Powell, J., concurring).
Street, 367 U.S. at 780 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 790-91 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
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contract to the
named protesting employees[,] ... violates ... the First
88
Amendment.
The very basis of an agency shop agreement, which enables unions to
collect fees from nonunion members simply does not mesh with the notion
that "dissent is not to be presumed. '89 In refusing to join a union, an
employee, at a minimum, has implicitly voiced his or her dissent from the
union and its objectives. Certainly, a nonmember employee who prefers that
a union not represent him or her in matters "germane to collective bargaining," 90 such as wages and benefits, would not wish to pay that union a
fee, a portion of which will be applied to distant political causes at the
union's whim. Furthermore, in a union shop, where membership is
compelled, dissent will surely be present, not only regarding the ways in
which union dues are spent but also regarding the very idea of unions or
compelled membership in them.
While the Court in Street found that the RLA does not authorize the
allocation of dissenting members' dues to political causes over their
objections, 9' by requiring that employees state their objections in order to
secure their First Amendment rights,92 the Court's decision, in effect, results
in the contrary. There is no rational basis for the Court's creation of a
presumption of no dissent in organizations that compel membership and
fees. 93 Thus, the Court's majorities, in effect, held that unions can spend
dissenting employees' dues on political causes until such time as their dissent
is openly voiced to the union. 94
IV.

THE GROWING REFORM MOVEMENT

A.

Washington -

The First Reformers

In 1992, Washington passed Initiative 134 by a seventy-two percent
margin and became the first state to pass reform legislation requiring unions
to obtain employees' consent prior to using their dues for political purposes. 95 In addition to being required to obtain the annual written consent
of employees prior to using their dues for political contributions, unions, as
well as employers, must use a prescribed consent form that informs

88. Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 774.
90. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 516 (1991).
91. Street, 367 U.S. at 771.
92. Id. at 774.
93. Id. (stating that "dissent is not to be presumed").
94. See id.; Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745-62 (1988).
95. 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 2; see also Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 901
P.2d 1028, 1030-31 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
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employees of the statutes' prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
an employee's failure to support the use of his or her dues for political
purposes.96 Furthermore, unions and employers that allocate a portion of
dues or fees for political causes must maintain and provide public access to
documentation of employee consent forms, the amount of money withheld
from each employee's dues and fees, and97 the amount and date on which the
moneys were given to a political entity.
Passage of the initiative seems to have had the most dramatic effect on
the Washington Education Association (WEA).98 After the initiative was
passed, teacher support for the union's Political Action Committee (PAC)
decreased over eighty-three percent, from 48,000 teachers to 8000.99

Controversy followed, as nonunion teachers,'0° and the Washington Public
Disclosure Commission (PDC) and the Washington Attorney General accused
the WEA of failing to comply with the mandates of the initiative. 1
Specifically, the PDC found that WEA had failed to disclose a $162,225
donation to its PAC, and the Attorney General filed suit alleging that the
"donation" was illegally drawn from employee dues. 10 2 The Attorney
General's suit also alleged that the WEA had failed
to report another
03
$170,000 related to political lobbying expenditures.1
More startling, the Attorney General charged that WEA spent, without
disclosure over $230,000 on political campaigns aimed at defeating
Washington school voucher and charter-school initiatives.1 °4 The Attorney
General also corroborated the PDC's finding that the WEA had established
a "Community Outreach Program" (COP), designed to skirt the mandates of
Initiative 134.105 Specifically, the COP made donations to PAC in excess
of $250,000 without first obtaining the employees' consent. 0 6 The
allegations of excessive violations of Initiative 134, if true, would suggest
that the WEA has panicked, perhaps believing that violating the statute is the

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

1993 Wash. Laws ch. 2, § 7(3).
Id. § 7(4).
See Rapp, supra note 5, at 30, 32.
Id. at 30.
Leer v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 172 F.R.D. 439 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Michelle

Malkin & 0. Casey Corr, Editorial, The WEA Lobby File: Calculated Deception, SEATTLE
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997, at B4; see Dick Lilly, Six Teachers to Sue Union Over PoliticalUse of

Dues, SEATTLE TIMES, June 24, 1997, at B3.
101. Malkin & Corr, supra note 101, at B4. The WEA has continuously denied any
violation of the provisions of Initiative 134. Id.
102. Editorial, Suit Against the WEA Enforces Right to Know, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 18,

1997, at B4.
103. Malkin & Corr, supra note 101, at B4.

104. Id.
105. Id.

106. Id.
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only means by which it can secure its continued vitality.
B.

California- Setting the Stage for State Reform

The California Campaign Reform Initiative (CRI) appeared on the ballot
in June 1998 as Proposition 226,17 and it failed to pass by a slim margin. 10 8
Members of California's Education Alliance drafted the
initiative 1°9 and turned in 775,000 signatures in support of it," greatly
exceeding the 433,269 necessary to get the measure on the state ballot."'
Passage of the initiative seemed imminent as polls suggested that over
seventy percent of Californians supported it, 1 2 with little difference in
support between union and nonunion members or between Democrats and
Republicans." 3 The battle between opponents and proponents of the
initiative heated up well in advance of organized labor's concentrated
campaign to defeat Proposition 226. For example, the Californians to Protect
Employee Rights organization unsuccessfully filed suit to have the initiative
signatures invalidated, 114 and the AFL-CIO has been accused of "harassing"
and bribing signature-gatherers." 5 These efforts precipitated the multimillion dollar campaign
by organized labor, which culminated in an enormous
116
political upset.
The provisions of the California initiative closely paralleled Washington's
Initiative 134.117 The California initiative would have required unions to
obtain the yearly written consent of employees on a prescribed form before
using employee dues and fees for political activities." 8 The proposed
initiative also would have mandated accurate record-keeping, including copies
of employee consent forms, the amount of funds withheld for political
expenditures, the amounts actually transferred to a political organization, and
the name of organizations to which the funds were transferred." 9 While
the initiative did not include the public access provisions of Washington

107. CRI: Summary, supra note 6.
108. Bayer, supra note 4, at A19.
109. Love, supra note 1, at 42-43.
110. Rapp, supra note 5, at 32.
111. Peter M. Warren & Eric Bailey, Political Finance Fight Looms over Bid to Curb
Labor Ballot Measures: Union Supporters Launch Three Initiatives Targeting Big Business
in Response to a Proposal That Would Restrict Use of Workers' Dues in Campaigns, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at BI.
112. CRI: Voter Support, supra note 6.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Love, supra note 1, at 42-43; Rapp, supra note 5, at 32.
Rapp, supra note 5, at 32.
Love, supra note 1, at 43.
Bayer, supra note 5, at A19.
See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
CRI: Text, supra note 6, § 4, ch. 5.9.
Id. § 85990(d).
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be sent
Initiative 134, it would have required that "[c]opies of all records..,
1 20
request.
upon
C]ommission
Practices
Political
to the [State Fair
C.

Movements Toward Reform -

Congress and Other States

In 1996, a bill aimed at amending the NLRA to require employees'
annual consent under a union security agreement before their dues could be
spent on union activities unrelated to collective bargaining was defeated in
the House of Representatives. 121 In 1997, both the House and Senate
122
introduced new bills that would similarly restrict the use of union dues.
However, the issue of reforming the current use of union dues promises to
be a major point of contention among Democrats and Republicans, and it
does not appear that such reform is currently very likely at the federal
level. 123
However, similar reform movements among state legislatures appear to
have a greater chance of success. Several state legislatures have introduced
bills that would require employees' consent before unions could spend their
dues on political causes. 124 For example, bills with these provisions have
been introduced in Michigan, Vermont, and Maryland. 125 Furthermore, in
1998, initiatives that would require unions to gain worker consent before
using dues for political purposes will likely appear on the ballot in Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Nevada, Ohio, Missouri, and Oregon, and similar
legislation is expected to pass in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado.1 26 If this
legislation passes, it could have substantial ramifications for union involvement in the U.S. political process.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT ON UNION POLITICS

A.

Impact on the Democratic Party

Less than four years after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Beck,
President Bush issued Executive Order 12,800, which required federal

120. Id.
121. The Worker Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996). Under the
amendment, dissenting employees no longer would have had the burden of objecting to a
union's use of their dues for political purposes. Id.
122. S. 497, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 59, 105th Cong. (1997).
123. See Senate Leadership: Lott Predicts Senate to Take Lead on Some Major Issues,
CONG. DAILY, Jan. 8, 1997.

124. Love, supra note 1, at 43.

125. S.480, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998); S.650, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997); H. 695,
65th Leg., Adj. Sess. (Vt. 1998).
126. Love, supra note 1, at 43; see Rapp, supra note 5, at 32.
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contractors to post notices informing nonunion members of their right to
object to the use of their fees for purposes unrelated to "collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment." ' 7 However,
shortly after President Clinton was elected, he issued Executive Order 12,836,
revoking Executive Order 12,800 "in order to eliminate Executive orders that
do not serve the public interest."'' 28 These executive orders highlight the
underlying significance of the Court's declaration in Street and Abood that
"dissent is not to be presumed."' 129 These cases portray the employee
objection requirement as a minor detail, standing between employees and
their right to refrain from funding political causes with which they
disagree."30 However, as a practical matter, if employees are not aware that
they need only "object" in order to trigger their First Amendment rights
under a union or agency shop, these rights remain dormant. In fact, most
union members are unaware of their right3 to prevent the union from spending
their fees and dues on political causes.1 '
President Clinton's revocation of Executive Order 12,800 also illustrates
the deep-running ties between unions and the Democratic party and the
latter's reliance on unions for financial support. 132 President Clinton's
order to remove notices informing working men and women of an important
legal right seems to have been driven by purely financial and political
motives.133 In light of the Democratic party's heavy reliance on union

127. Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992-1993). The order further warned
that government contractors which failed to comply with the terms of the order could have
their contracts canceled or suspended or become ineligible for future contracts with the
government. Id.
128. Exec. Order No. 12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. 7045 (1993).
129. Street, 367 U.S. at 774.
130. See id.; Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-238.
131. Harry Beck, Editorial, My Union Dues Don't Go To Politics, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
1, 1996, at 27A. A poll conducted in the mid-1990s indicated that 78% of union members
were not aware of their rights under the Beck decision. Id.
132. It is estimated that during the 1980s, labor PACs directed close to 90% of their
contributions to the Democratic party. Stratmann, supra note 2, at 604; see also Aaron
Bernstein, How Business Is Winning Its War with the NLRB, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 27, 1997, at
59 (discussing the political nature of the National Labor Relations Board and its recent
appointment of Board Members); Fawell Presses Criticism of Union Dues for Campaigns,
CONGRESS DAILY, Apr. 18, 1996 (stating that AFL-CIO planned to spend $35 million on
campaigning for the reelection of President Clinton and other members of the Democratic
party).
133. However, it has been suggested that Executive Order No. 12,800 was no less political.
Michael H. LeRoy, Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality of
Executive Order 12,954 Debarment of ContractorsWho HirePermanentStrikerReplacements,
37 B.C. L. REv. 229, 249-50 (1996). One commentator has suggested that President Bush
issued the order in an effort to "deny the use of union dues for campaign expenditures." Id.
at 250. Regardless of President Bush's possible motives, this argument is undermined by the
fact that employees are not legally required to subsidize union support of political candidates.
See Beck, 487 U.S. at 745, 762.
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dues, it would follow that measures, such as Washington's Initiative 134,
which threaten the financial vitality of unions, could weaken the Democratic
party and alter, if not undermine, its political agenda. 34 It is difficult to
precisely predict the loss in contributions that the Democratic party would
136
experience, 35 but if the State of Washington provides any indication,
their loss could be substantial. Specifically, a decline in fees for political
expenditures from teacher's unions could open the door for dramatic changes
in public education as we know it.
B.

Opening the Doorfor School Vouchers?

One particular change that reform initiatives aimed at union political
expenditures could facilitate is the implementation of school voucher 137 and
school choice programs. 3 8 Labor unions have voiced strong opposition to
these programs 139 and have spent substantial amounts of time and money
on campaigns to prevent their implementation.' 40 Teachers' unions, such
as the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education
Association, fear that voucher programs will threaten the integrity of public

134. Jonathan Cohn, TRBfrom Washington, NEW REPUBLIC, June 29, 1998, at 6; see Eric
Alterman, Buchanon Fodder (Presidential Candidate Patrick Buchanon) (Right Thinking),
NATION, Mar. 18, 1996, at 6 (reporting Grover Norquist as saying that the National Education
Association, the strongest union in the Democratic party, exerts considerable influence over
Democrats in opposing programs such as school choice).
135. However, it was speculated, for example, that if the Campaign Reform Initiative had
passed in California, unions probably would have experienced more than a 50% decline in
funds that otherwise would have been directed towards political causes. Unions and Politics:
Measure Would Require Consentfor Dues, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Jan. 7, 1998, at B6.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
137. School vouchers differ from school choice programs in that the former includes
religious and private schools, while the latter does not. Carol L. Ziegler & Nancy M.
Lederman, School Vouchers: Are Urban Students Surrendering Rights for Choice, 19
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813, 816 (1992).

138. See Rapp, supra note 5, at 32.
139. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DE-VALUING OF AMERICA: THE FIGHT FOR OUR CULTURE

AND OUR CHILDREN 65 (1992); see also Angela G. Smith, Public School Choice and Open
Enrollment: Implicationsfor Education, Desegregation,and Equity, 74 NEB. L. REV. 255, 290
(1995) (stating that "[t]eachers' unions have adamantly opposed school choice laws"). Many
members of the Democratic party similarly oppose school vouchers and school choice
programs. Jonathan Rauch, Choose or Lose (TRB-Liberals and School Choice), NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 10, 1997, at 4; see Alterman, supra note 134, at 6; Jerelyn Eddings et. al.,
Voices from the Gallery Fearful and Eager, Voters Are Talking Up a Storm of Worries and
Wishes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1996, at 28; William Niskanen, Wages of Sin,

REv., Sept. 2, 1996, at 64, 65. But see Kenneth T. Walsh & David Gergen, Bush's
Plansfor Sununu, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 3, 1991, at 34 (stating that a number of
Democrats favor school choice programs).
140. See Margaret A. Nero, The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program: Why
Voucher ProgramsDo Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1134
(1997); Rapp, supra note 5, at 30, 32; supra text accompanying note 100.
NAT'L
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education, decentralize 14authority
in public education, and threaten the jobs of
1
public school teachers.
California provides a prime example of the relationship between the
adamant opposition of teachers' unions to school vouchers and the movement
towards reforming the current use of compulsory union dues and fees for
political purposes. 142 In California, Frank Ury, a founding member of the
Education Alliance and one of the drafters of the California Campaign
Reform Initiative, voiced public support for California's 1993 voucher
initiative, as well as other "conservative" education causes. 14 3 In 1996, the
California Teachers Association union and its local affiliate responded by
spending approximately $70,000 on a political campaign to ensure that he
was not reelected to his position on the Orange County Saddleback Valley
Unified District School Board.' 44 Ury was apparently inspired to spearhead
the Campaign Reform Initiative as a direct result of this union campaign
against him. 45 Union expenditures aimed at defeating California's Campaign Reform Initiative have, no doubt, dwindled available union funds that
46
would be necessary to again quash a California voucher initiative.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The widespread use of compulsory union dues and agency shop fees for
political causes raises serious First Amendment concerns. The major
Supreme Court cases in this area of law generally stand for the proposition
that because of the government's interest in promoting labor peace, dissenting
employees subjected to union and agency shop agreements must affirmatively
voice their objections to labor unions' use of their dues and fees for political
purposes in order to trigger their First Amendment rights. Therefore, the
hard-earned money of many workers continues to be spent by unions on
political causes that run contrary to those workers' wishes and beliefs.
This unfortunate predicament has resulted, at least in part, from the
Supreme Court's decisions in this area of law. The Court's failure in Street
and Beck to scrutinize the NLRA and the RLA in light of the First

141. Jeremy Rabkin, Racial Progressand ConstitutionalRoadblocks, 34 WM. & MARY L.

REV. 75, 87, & n.37 (1992); see also Peter J. Perla, The Colorado Charter Schools Act and
the Potentialfor Unconstitutional Applications Under Article IX, Section 15 of the State

Constitution, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 171, 196 (1996).
142. See Rapp, supra note 5, at 30, 32.
143. Id.

144. Id.
145. Id.

146. Id. (suggesting that in order to defeat the California Campaign Reform Initiative,
unions would have to spend $25 to $30 million); see also Alan Eisner Reuters, June Vote
Could Doom Democrats' Union Link: California Ballot Issue Would Require Workers to

Earmark Union Dues, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 14, 1998, at 58A.
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Amendment enabled it to engage in balancing the interests of the minority,
that is, union dissenters and nonmembers, against the interests of collective
bargaining and avoiding the "free rider" problem. However, had the First
Amendment analysis seemingly undertaken by the Court in these cases been
pushed to the forefront of the decisions, it is difficult to see how the Court
could have found that "dissent is not to be presumed." Certainly there were
alternatives that would have preserved the First Amendment rights of the
minority as well as the integrity of collective bargaining. For example, in
Street, the Court could have presumed that some of the union members did
not wish for the union to allocate their fees to political causes. Thus, the
Court could have placed the burden on unions to obtain the consent of
employees before directing their dues to causes unrelated to collective
bargaining. The Court's imposition of the objection requirement on
dissenters suggests that the First Amendment rights of the minority were
weighed behind closed doors against the financial vitality of unions.
The solution to the First Amendment problems posed by the Supreme
Court's reading of the RLA and NLRA seems simple: require unions to gain
the priorconsent of employees before allocating their dues money to political
causes. This solution is precisely what the state of Washington has
implemented through a ballot initiative. Furthermore, this issue is receiving
increasing attention by numerous states, as well as the U.S. Congress,
suggesting that reform, in at least some states, is inevitable. Finally, the
seemingly bipartisan support among the populace for reform further promises
that soon labor unions may no longer enjoy largely unfettered discretion over
how union dues and fees are spent.
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